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Abstract A two-stage, two-player noncooperative game model is developed
(under an irreversible capital investment assumption) with the main aim of
predicting the number of vessels that each player in such a game willfmd in his
best interest to employ in the exploitation of the Arcto-Norwegian cod stock,
given a noncooperative environment and the fact that all players are jointly
constrained by the population dynamics of the resource. The predictions so
obtained are then compared with d) the sole owner'.s optimal capacity invest-
ment.s for the two players; (ii) the results in Sumaita (1994), where perfect
malleability of capacity is assumed implicitly: and (Hi) available data on the
Acrto-Norwegian cod fishery.
Keywords Noncooperative, game, fisheries, irreversible, capital, trawl,
coastal.
Introduction
This paper considers noncooperative use of a common property fish stock,
namely the Arcto-Norwegian cod. Attention is focused on a restricted access
fishery where only two-agents participate in the exploitation of the resource, the
aim being to predict the number of vessels that each agent in such a situation will
find in his best interest to employ. An important although self-evident aspect of
the game is that both agents are jointly constrained by the population dynamics of
the resource. The key assumption of the paper is that players undertake invest-
ment in capital that is irreversible. This assumption is quite realistic because
capital embodied in fishing vessels is often non-malleable: Non-malleability is
used here to refer to the existence of constraints upon the disinvestment of capital
assets utilized in the exploitation of the resource (Clark et al., 1979). This implies
that once a fishing tlrm or authority invests in a fleet of vessels it either has to keep
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it until the fleet is depreciated, or else the vessels can only be disposed off at
considerable economic loss.
A number of papers have appeared in the fishery economics literature that
focus, among other things, on the irreversibility of capital employed in the ex-
ploitation of fishery resources. Examples include Clark et al. (1979), Clark &
Kirkwood (1979). Dudley & Waugh (1980). Charles (1983a. 1983b). and Charles &
Munro (1985). We are. however, not aware of any prior work that models, com-
putes numerically and analyses the exploitation of fishery resources as done in
this paper. Among the examples cited above, only Dudley & Waugh (1980) con-
sider investment decision in a fishery with more than a single agent participating.
But even in this case, only qualitative statements of the likely effects of this are
made. The study of Clark & Kirkwood (1979) is close to the work planned herein,
at least in terms of the kind of questions they address. The authors presented a
bioeconomic model that predicts the number of vessels of each of the two types
entering the prawn fishery of the Gulf of Carpentaria under free access. In addi-
tion, they estimated the economically optimal number of vessels of each type. The
results they obtained are then compared with available data on the prawn fishery
of the Gulf of Carpentaria.
These are issues we also address here albeit with a number of differences.
First, there is a difference with respect to the number of agents in the two studies:
While Clark & Kirkwood (1979) consider the social planner's and open access
equilibrium fleet sizes, we compute equilibrium fleet sizes that will emerge in a
noncooperative environment involving two agents, and then, using these results,
we derive the social planner's equilibrium fleet size and discuss the probable open
access equilibrium fishing capacity. Thus, we add a new dimension to the discus-
sion, namely, the two-agent analysis.' Second, there is a difference in the way we
model the population dynamics of the fish stock: While their study prescribes and
uses a single cohort to describe the fish stock, we accommodate a multicohort
population structure.
The detail concern of this study is to develop the necessary framework to
(1) identify a Nash noncooperative equilibrium solution for a bimatrix game in-
volving the trawl and coastal fisheries operating on the Arcto-Norwegian cod;
(2) identify the sole owner equilibrium solutions for the two fisheries, and deter-
mine which among these gives the optimal solution;
(3) compare the results in (1) and (2) above to (i) the results in Sumaila (1994),
where perfect malleability of capital is assumed implicitly, and (ii) with avail-
able data on the Arcto-Norwegian cod. The former comparison would put us
in a position to say something about the possible gains of establishing rental
firms for fishing vessels and/or allowing mobility of vessels between different
stocks;
(4) discuss the fishing capacities that are likely to emerge In an open access
scenario;
and
(5) investigate the effect of fixed cost, interest rates, initial stock size, and the
terminal constraint, on the relative profitability of the players.
' The motivation for undertaking a two-agent analysis is given in section 2 of this paper.A Two-Stage Bimatrix Fishery Game Model 265
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The next section gives a brief description of the Arcto-Norwegian cod fishery.
The third section presents the model, a special feature of which is the explicit
modeling of the biologically and economically important age groups of cod. This
is followed by a brief mention of the algorithm for the computation of the equi-
librium solutions: The detailed algorithm is relegated to an appendix. In the fifth
section, the results of the study are stated. Finally the sixth section concludes the
paper.
The Arcto-Norwegian Cod Fishery
The Arcto-Norwegian cod, gadus morhtta, is a member of the Atlantic cod family,
arguably among the world's most important fish species. It inhabits the continen-
tal shelf from shoreline to 600 m depth, or even deeper, usually 150-200 m. It is
gregarious in behaviour, forming shoals or schools and undertaking spawning and
feeding migrations. The diet of adult cod is variable and consists mainly of her-
ring, capelin, haddock and codling. The Arcto-Norwegian cod spawns only along
the Norwegian coast, mainly in Lofoten in April-March. Typically, it starts
spawning at the age of 7-8 years; eggs are carried by the gulf stream, over the
coast where they hatch, and into the Barents Sea. up towards Svalbard. where the
young cod grow. It has a relatively long life span: it can live for well over 15 years.
A majority of young cod die quite early, either because of a lack of adequate food,
or because they are eaten up by other fishes. Young cod between the ages of 3-6
come to the Finnmark's coast every year. This is because mature capelin. which
cod preys on. move to their spawning spots close to the Finnmark's coast. Cod
follows and predates them, thus resulting in good spring cod in the period April to
June.
The Arcto-Norwegian cod is a shared resource jointly managed by Norway
and Russia. Norwegian fishers employ mainly coastal and trawl fishery vessels in
the exploitation of the resource, while their Russian counterparts employ mainly
trawlers. Table I gives the number of Norwegian trawl and coastal fishery vessels
{of I3m longest length and over) that operated on the "cod fishes group"^ for five
different years. In addition to this comes the part of the fishing capacity employed
to exploit other species, say, the "herring fishes group" that are used to land the
cod fishes as bycatch.
^ The cod fishes group include, the Arcto-Norwegian cod. the Arcto-Norwegian haddock,
whiting, Greenland halibut, saith, etc.266 U. R. Sumaila
Using Norwegian data.^ we calculated the number of coastal fishery vessels
and trawlers used by Norwegian fishers in the exploitation of the cod fishes group
in 1991 to be about 638 and 58, respectively. These landed about 130 and 270
thousand tonnes of cod. respectively.
To facilitate our analysis three simplifications (about this fishery) are made.'*
First, only Norwegian prices and costs are used in the analysis. Second, the vessel
types employed in the exploitation of the resource are grouped into two broad
categories, namely, the coastal and the trawl fisheries, and placed under the
management of two separate and distinct management authorities, henceforth to
be known as Coastal Fisheries Management (C), and Trawl Fisheries Manage-
ment (T). Third, only the most cost effective vessels^ in each of these categories
are assumed to be employed in the exploitation of the resource. The assignment
of two separate and distinct fleets to the two management authorities captures, to
some extent, the division of the stock between Norway and Russia, but even in
Norway a division is usually made between the coastal fleet and the trawlers, and
the Norwegian quota is divided between these.
The Model
The model presented here builds on that discussed in Sumaila (1994). to which the
reader is referred for details. Here, a two-stage, two-player, dynamic, determin-
istic, noncooperative game model is put together, the two players being T and C.
By a game we mean a normal (strategic) form, simultaneous-move game in which
both players make their investment decisions in ignorance of the decision of the
other. At stage one of the game, each player invests in fishing capacity ex ante,
having in mind that such investment is irreversible. Then in stage two the players
employ their chosen capacity investment to exploit the shared resource for the
next 15 years, subject to the stock dynamics and nonnegativity constraints.
Both T and C are assumed to be rational and act here to maximize their
discounted profit (payoff) function 11;: Ky x K^ —*• Sft. where Ky and K^- are the
pure strategy sets of player / = T. C. that is. the set of fishing capacity (number
of vessels or fleet size) that a player can choose from. Player /'s payoff at an
outcome (ky,kc) is then given by ni(ky.kc). A major aim of this modeling exercise
is to find the strategy pair (k^.k^) such that no player will find it in his interest to
change strategy given that his opponent keeps to his. In other words, we are
interested in finding Nash noncooperative equilibrium in a two-player fishery
game, where k| is a best reply to k^ and vice versa. This is equivalent to stipu-
lating that the inequalities
nc(kf k5) ^ nc(k^,kc) (1)
hold for all feasible k^ and k^.
^ Data in tables E21-E51 in L0nnsomhetsunders0kelser (1979-1990) were used for the
calculations.
" See Sumaila (1994) for the justifications for these simplifications.
^ Cost effectiveness is defined here in terms of least cost per kilogram of fish landed.A Two-Stage Bimatrix Fishery Game Model 267
On existence of Nash equilibrium
Nash (1950, 1951) proved the existence of equilibrium points under certain as-
sumptions on each player's strategy space and corresponding payoff function.
Essentially, he dealt with matrix games. Rosen (1965) went further to show that
when every joint strategy lie in a convex, closed, and hounded region in the
product space and each player's payoff function W^, / = T. C is concave in his own
strategy and continuous in all variables, then there is at least one Nash equilibrium
of the game. This result is stated in theorem 1 below.
THEOREM I (Existence of Nash equilibrium. Rosen (1965)): An equilibrium
point exist for every concave n-person game.
The game we formulate in this paper is a concave 2-person game, and hence
satisfies the above theorem. We can therefore expect at least one Nash equilib-
rium to exist in our game.
On uniqueness of Nash equilibrium
Two steps are taken here to deal with the vexing problem of equilibrium selection.
Step 1: Only open loop strategies are allowed in the second stage of the game.*
That is. each player commits, in advance, his fishing capacity to a fixed time
function rather than a fixed control law (closed loop strategies). Note that unlike
in the case of fixed control laws, where the choice of control depends on the past
history of the game, fixed time functions are independent of the actions of the
opponent so far in the game. In information theoretic sense open loop corresponds
to the receipt of no information during play, while closed loop represents full
information.
The main reason we stick to open loop strategies, even though it is not likely
to lead us to closed form solutions, is that it would be practically impossible to
compute the predictions of our model if closed loop strategies were allowed. This
is because closed loop strategies normally entail complex and huge numbers of
strategies in repeated games (see Binmore. 1982). Another reason is that the new
"Folk Theorem for Dynamic Games" introduced by Gaitsgory and Nltzan,
(1994), gives us reason to believe that under certain monotonicity assumptions,
the set of closed loop solutions that may emerge from our model may coincide
with the open loop solutions we compute herein.
Step 2: The same shadow prices (that is, Lagrange multipliers) are imposed
across both players for resource constraint violation. Flam (1993) shows that in
addition to this, if the marginal profit correspondence is strictly monotone, then
there exists a unique Nash equilibrium for our game. Incidentally strict monoto-
nicity of marginal profit correspondence is also a sufficient condition for conver-
gence in our model.
In the presentation of the mathematical equations in the rest of the model, two
other subscripts (a = 0 A, and s = 1. . . . , S) are used to denote age
groups offish, and time periods or stages, respectively.^ Based on the life expec-
** Tn a sense one can argue that the game we formulate herein is not a "pure" open loop
strategy game. This is because although the fishing capacities are chosen once and for all,
the capacity utilization Is chosen in each period depending on the stock size.
' Recall that the subscript denoting player is / = T, C.268 U. R. Sumaila
tancyofcod, the last age group A, is set equal to 15. The finite time horizon of the
game, S, is set equal to 15 due to computational limitations.
Catch
Let catch of age group a (in number offish) by player / in fishing period s, hi^s,
be given by
"i.a.a ~ 1i.a^a,s^i,s (2)
where the effort profile, Ej^ = k^e^^. and kj is the ex ante fixed capacity invest-
ment of player /; ej ^ e [0.1], is the capacity utilisation, that is, the fraction of kj
taken out for fishing in a given year; n^.^ is the post catch number of fish of age a
in fishing period .v and qj,, is the player and age-dependent catchability coefficient,
that is, the share of age group a cod being caught by one unit of effort.
Total catch by all players of age group a in period s can thus be written as
ha,s = Z> qi.ana.skiei.s (3)
i
Total catch in weight by all players over all age groups in period s is given by
hs = 2 hasWa (4)
where w., is the weight of fish of age group a.
Costs and Prices
The fishery is assumed to face perfectly elastic demand. Thus, the ex-vessel
selling price offish per kilogram, V, is assumed to be constant. The harvesting
costs per vessel employed by player / in period s. ijj|^ consist of fixed costs (tp^) and
variable costs (-9;) which are proportionate to t,^^.
where b = O.OI. This formulation of the cost function ensures strict concavity of
individual profit as a function of individual effort. This strictness is important for
the sake of convergence.
Revenue
The revenue to player /, in period s, Ti^, comes from the sale of his catch over all
age groups in that period, that is.A Two-Stage Bimatrix Fishery Game Model 269
Profits
Player Ts profit in a given period s is then given by tbe equation
Tri.s(ns.ei,s) ^ TJ., - kj^j.^ (7)
where k = (kj.k^i). Note that iTi, is a function of the actual fish abundance in a
period, n^. and own effort In that period. We restrict our analysis to the case of
perfectly non-malleable capita! in which the depreciation rate is equal to zero and
capital has a negligible scrap value. Even though this simplification is not quite
realistic, the qualitative effect of this is expected to be insignificant. The profit
function given by equation (7) is formulated to incorporate this restriction.
Objective
Given k,, the second stage problem of player / is to find a sequence of capacity
utilization, ej^ (s = 1,2 S), to maximise his present value (PV) of profits
(payoff), that is,
8s / \ /OS
^^ iiri(ns,ei.s) (o)
subject to the stock dynamics (see below) and the obvious nonnegativity con-
straints, expressed mathematically as ei^ ^ 0, for all i and .v; n^ ,, ^ 0, for all a and
.v;n^,S + 1 ^0. for all fl. and n^,0^0 given. Here, S, = (I + ri)"' is the discount
factor; rj > 0 denotes the interest rate of player /; and n^ o is a vector representing
the initial number offish of each age group.
An important but self-evident component of this game is that players are
jointly constrained by the population dynamics of the fish stock. Nature is intro-
duced (as a player) in the game with the sole purpose of ensuring that the joint
constraints are enforced. The decision variable of nature is thus the stock levels
its objective being to ensure the feasibility of the stock dynamics. Formally,
nature's objective is expressed as 0 if the stock dynamics is feasible, and -=»
otherwise.
It is worth mentioning here that unless players enjoy bequest, they will typi-
cally drive the fishable age groups of the stock to the open access equilibrium level
at the end of the game, if the terminal restriction is simply n^ s.^, ^ 0, Va. To
counteract this tendency, one can exogeneously impose the more restrictive con-
straint, n^s +1 ^ "a* where n^ is a certain minimum level of the stock of age group
a that must be in the habitat at the end of period S + 1. This is what is done here.
Alternatively, this restriction can be imposed endogeneously by obliging the play-270 V. R. Sumaila
ers to enter into a stationary regime maintaining constant catches and keeping
escapment fixed from S onwards.
Stock dynamics
Let the stock dynamics of the biomass of fish in numbers n.^^, (that is, the joint
constraint mentioned above) be described by
for 0<a<A
nA.s + hA,s ^ ^AnA,s-i + 4A-inA-i,s-i, given n^.o (9)
where fCB^-i) = OLBS_ /I + 7B^_ i is the Beverton-Hoh recruitment^ function;
B^_, = 5!.,p.,w^^n^^_ I represents the post-catch biomass in numbers; p^ is the
proportion of mature fish of age a; w^^ is the weight at spawning offish of age a;
a* and 7 are constant parameters chosen to give a maximum stock size of about
6 million tonnes—a number considered to be the approximate carrying capacity of
the habitat;'" ^.^ is the natural survival rate of fish of age a, and h.^^ defined earlier,
denotes the combined harvest of fish of age a, in fishing season .s by all agents.
Numerical Method
An algorithm is developed to resolve the second stage game problem, that is to
find the answer to the following question: given the fixed capacity choice of the
players in stage one of the game, what level of capacity utilization should they
choose in each fisbing period so as to maximize their respective economic bene-
fits? For detailed discussions of the theoretical basis for the algorithm see in
particular Flam (1993), and also Sumaila (1993). In what follows, we briefiy out-
line the conceptual algorithm and describe in concrete terms its practical imple-
mentation, the detailed problem-specific algorithm is relegated to an appendix.
Suppose for illustrative purposes that all constraints (except nonnegativity
ones) are incorporated into one concave restriction of the form <t>(n,ej,e_i) ^ 0,
where e., is the profile of capacity utilisation of/'s rival, ej is the equivalent for
player /', and n is the stock profile (note that n e R"^+"-s, and CjC R^ are large
vectors, hence, the a and s subscripts are ignored here). Then we can state the
payoff function of player 1 as follows
* In this model, recruitment refers to the number of age zero fish that enter the habitat in
each fishing period.
^ a ^ f'(0), is the number of recruits per unit weight of biomass "at zero" or the polutation
level.
'" Researchers at the Institute of Marine Research. Bergen, estimate the maximum sus-
tainable yield (MSY) stock level to be about 3 million tonnes: With an assumption that the






Li(n.ei,e-j,y.k) = i.,) + yO-(n,ei.e_i,k) (11)
s=l
is a modified Lagrangian. y is the Lagrange multiplier, (e*,n*,y*) are equilibrium
solutions of the variables in question, and tt" is given by min{O,<I>). The adjust-






n = = y an
(14)
where aLi(.)/aei and aLi(.)% are the partial derivatives of L|(.) with respect to e;
and y, and a<t)"/an is the partial derivative of the eonstraint function with respect
to n.
The algorithm then comes in differential form: Starting at arbitrary initial
points (ei,y.n). the dynamics represented by the adjustment rules are pursued all
the way to the stationary points (ef ,n*,y*). Such points satisfy, by definition, the
steady-state generalized equation system:
0 = <I''(n,ej.e_i,k),
, Vi
with y* ^ 0. It is standard from mathematical programming that individual opti-
mality and stock feasibility then obtains. The numerical scheme uses Euler's
method to integrate (12). (13). and (14) all the way to the equilibrium solutions
(er,n*,y*).272 V. R. Sumaila
Table 2

















































































































Note: (1) The values for q(p. a) are calculated using the procedure outlined in Sumaila (1994). (2)
Player T exploits fish of age 4 and above and player C fish of age group 7 and above (Hannesson. 1993).
Numerical Results
A strategic form for our game is given in table 5.1. To obtain these results, the
newly developed dynamic simulation software package, POWERSIM." is used as
computational support. The parameter values listed in Table 2 are used for the
computations. In addition, a and -y are set equal to 1.01 and 1.5, respectively, to
give a maximum biomass of 6 million tonnes for a pristine stock. Based on the
survival rate of cod. £1^ is given a value of 0.81. The price parameter V. is set equal
to NOK 6.78. The variable costs (^-j & ^(-) and fixed costs (tpy & cp^) for engaging
a vessel are calculated to be (NOK 12.88 & 0.88) and (NOK 15.12 & 0.65) million
for T and C, respectively.'' The interest rate, r,, is set equal to 1% as recom-
mended by the Ministry of Finance of Norway. The initial number of cod of each
age group is calibrated using the 1992 estimate of the stock size of cod in tonnes.'^
In Table 3. rows represent player T's pure strategies k-j- and columns represent
player C's pure strategies k^. Player T's payoff is placed in the southwest corner
of the cell in a given row and column and the payoff to player C is placed in the
northeast corner. The best payoff for player T in each column and the best payoff
" Powersim is a dynamic simulation software package developed by ModellData AS in
Bergen, Norway. The model has many powerful features, including the ability to process
array variables.
'^ The price per kilogram of NOK 6.78 is taken from table 22 in Central Bureau of Statistics
of Norway (1989-1990). The parameters d^ and tp^ are calculated using cost data in L0nn-
somhetsunders0kelser (1979-1990).
'^ The 1992 stock size is estimated at 1.8 million tonnes (Ressursoversikt. 1993).A Two-Stage Bimatrix Fishery Game Model 273
to player C in each row are bold-faced. As an example notice that 19.4 has been
bold-faced in cell kj = 65 and kc = 500. since 19.4 lies in row k^ = 65. this tells
us that pure strategy k-,- = 65 is player T's best reply to a choice of pure strategy
kc = 500 by player C.
Notice that the only cell in Table 3 that has both payoffs bold-faced is that
which lies in row k-^ = 57 and column ke = 1050. Thus the only pure strategy pair
that constitutes a Nash equilibrium is (57.1050). Each strategy in this pair is a best
reply to the other. This gives total PV of eeonomic benefit equal to 2ini(57,1050)
- NOK 25.87 billion, with nT(57,1050) - NOK 11.84 billion and nc(57,1050) =
NOK 14.03 billion, respectively.
The overall PV of economic rents from the fishery as a function of k^ and k^
are given in Table 4. The entries in each cell of this table are simply the sum of the
entries in corresponding cells in Table 3. These results indicate an optimal fieet
consisting of 1100 coastal vessels and no trawlers with PV of economic rent equal
to NOK 36.11 billion, or NOK 32.83 million per vessel. In contrast, a discounted
protlt maximising fieet consisting solely of trawlers would be made up of 70
vessels and earn a PV of economic rent of NOK 32.42 billion, or NOK 463.14
million per vessel.
The model thus appears to support the general theoretical assertion that non-
cooperation generally results in rent dissipation through the use of excess fishing
capacity. The economic theory of fisheries predicts that in an open access fishery,
economic rent would normally be dissipated completely (Gordon, 1954; Hannes-
son, 1993). Table 4 indicates that a trawl-coastal fishery vessel combination of a
little over 120-2500 vessels would dissipate discounted economic rent from the
fishery to nil. Thus, this vessel combination or its equivalent, is our models
prediction of the open access fishing capacity. If the agents in the fishery were to
receive subsidies totally NOK 9.48 billion (in present value) in addition to having
open access to the resource, then the model's prediction of fishing capacity is 140
trawlers and 3000 coastal vessels or their equivalent. It should be interesting to
compare the equilibrium stock and harvest profiles that would result under "open
access plus subsidy", open access. Nash noncooperative, and the sole ownership
equilibria. This is done graphically in Figures 1 and 2 below. The figures illustrates
clearly the adverse effects of "open access plus subsidy", open access, Nash
noncooperative equilibria as compared to the optimal solution.
Notice that contrary to expectations, the biomass is not completely depleted at
the end of the game. There are two possible reasons for this. In the first place
players are not allowed to exploit all age groups of fish. Secondly, even if this was
allowed, it would not be economically profitable to catch every single fish available.
Perfect malleability versus perfect non-malleability
We label the model in Sumaila (1994) the perfect malleable capital model and that
in this paper the perfect non-malleable capital model. The purpose here is to
compare the capacity investments and the PV of economic rent accruabie to the
players both individually and to society at large, in the two models. To do this, the
perfect malleable model is run using comparable prices and costs. Table 5 below
gives the capacity predictions of the two models, and the PV of economic rents to
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Fig. I. Stock profiles {in million tonnes): Illustrates the post-catch stock size in each period
for open access plus subsidy (OAS), open access (0A>, Nash equilibrium (NE), T only and
C only (the optimal solution).
is active. It is seen from this table that vessel capacity investment varies from year
to year in the case of the malleable capital model.
A possible interpretation here Is that each player evaluates his optimal capac-
ity requirement in a given year and then rents precisely this quantity from a rental
firm for fishing vessels.''* For instance, when both are active, T"s optimal vessel
size varies from a high of 65 in the third year to a low of 41 trawlers in year 15,
while Cs varies from a high of 939 in year 3 to a low of 564 in the iast year. In the
non-malleable capital model, however. T's ex ante fixed capacity investment is 57
trawlers, and the corresponding capacity investment for C is 1050 coastal vessels.
The economic results given by the two models are given in the third column of
Table 5. Two important observations can be made from this table. First, the
maximum economic rent from the resource are different in the two models: NOK
44.53 billion is achieved in the malleable capital model and NOK 36.11 in the
non-malleable one. The higher PV of economic rent achievable in the malleable
capital model can be attributed to the removal of the restriction that non-
malleability of capital imposes on the agents. The negative impact of this restric-
tion is quite substantial, reaching upto about NOK 12 billion (or 47% of what is
achievable under the restriction) in the case of the Nash equilibrium solution. This
clearly demonstrates that there is much to be gained from establishing rental firms
for fishing vessels. Or rather, by allowing mobility of vessels between different
stocks.'-''
Second, in both models the best economic results are achieved when C oper-
ates the fishery alone. However, the superiority of C becomes sharper in the
nonmalleable capital model: There is a difference of well over 10% (In favour of
''' A practical way to view these variations is that the agents in this model have alternative
uses for their vessel capacities, thereby making it possible for them to divert excess ca-
pacity in any given year to such uses.
'^ Hannesson (1993) looks more closely at the possible gains from allowing mobility of







Fig. 2. Harvest profiles (in million tonnes): Illustrates total harvest in each period for open
access plus subsidy (OAS), open access (OA). Nash equilibrium (NE). T only and C only
(the optimal solution).
C) in the PV of economic rent accruable in the nonmalleable capital model. In the
malleable capital model, however, a difference of only about 5% is noted. This
finding may have to do with the relatively high fixed cost of trawlers and the fact
that fixed costs must be taken as given by the players in the nonmalleable capital
model.
Comparison with available data on the Arcto-Nonvegian cod fishery
It is stated in section 2 that in 1991 the equivalent of fishing capacity of about 638
coastal vessels and 58 trawlers were operated by Norwegian fishers to land 130
and 270 thousand tonnes of cod, respectively. This implies that catch per trawler
is about 4655 tonnes and catch per coastal fishery vessel is 203 tonnes. Now, the
Nash equilibrium strategies stipulate vessel sizes of 1050 for C and 57 for T.
Together, these capacities are used to land an average of about 842 thousand
tonnes a year."^ Of the total, trawlers land 412 thousand tonnes and the coastal
fishery vessels 430 thousand tonnes. Thus catch per vessel are 7228 and 410
tonnes for a trawler and coastal fishery vessel, respectively. These numbers sig-
nify the incidence of overcapacity in the Arcto-Norwegian cod fishery even in
comparison to the results from a noncooperative solution. Comparison with the
sole owner's optimal solution reveals an even greater degree of overcapacity in
the fishery: In this case 1100 vessels are used to land an average about 770
thousand tonnes of fish per year by C (that is. 700 tonnes per vessel) and 70
trawlers to land an average of about 780 thousand tonnes per year by T (well over
10000 tonnes per vessel). A catch per trawl vessel of 10000 tonnes per year
"^ Note that these harvests comprise both Norwegian and Russian landings, since we do
not differentiate between the two in our model.U. R. Sumaila
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appears to be high, probably the proportionality assumption (underlying the har-
vest function) between the stock size and the catch per vessel is appropriate only
when variation in the stock size is not too large.
Effect of fixed costs, interest rates, initial stock size, and terminal eonstraint
Fixed costs. Sensitivity analysis shows that (for the game solution), the elasticity
of the PV of economic benefits accruable to the players T and C with respect to
fixed costs are about -0.7 and -0.4, respectively.^'Hence, to achieve the higher
discounted economic rent, T needs a drop in its fixed costs relative to those of C
of about 28%. The equivalent elasticities in the sole owner solutions are -0.3 for
T and -0.2 for C, which implies that T needs a drop in its fixed costs relative to
those of C of about 39% to take over from C as the producer of the optimal
solution. We also investigated the effects of zero fixed costs. This is the same as
assuming that fixed costs are considered to be "sunk" by the agents. Under such
an assumption, C and T achieve discounted economic rents of NOK 20.27 and
19.7 billion, respectively, in the game situation, and NOK 42.06 (C) and 42.64 (T)
in the sole ownership solutions. We see that the previously clear superiority of C
is now neutralised to a great extent.
Interest rates. For the game situation, we found that a 1% drop in the interest
rate faced by both players results in a \% increase in the relative profitability'^ of
T. On the other hand, an equivalent drop in the interest rate in the sole ownership
scenario leads to an increase of 0.5% in the relative profitability of C. Intuitively,
it is not difficult to understand why T does relatively better in the game situation
while C does relatively better in the sole ownership case: Since T harvests ev-
erything from age group 4 and above, while C harvests only age groups 7 and
above, it is no wonder that T is the one best positioned to capitalize on the
increase in patience that a decrease in interest rate entails. C does better in the
sole ownership scenario because an increase in patience plus the fact that C
harvests fish from age group 7 and above means that a larger proportion of the
stock will reach maximum weight before they are harvested, thereby resulting in
better relative profitability for C.
'^ Recall that the elasticity of a function, f(x,y). with respect to x is defined as the per-
centage increase in f(x.y) resulting from a 1% increase in x.
'" Relative profitability is defined as discounted economic rent to T divided by discounted
economic rent to C multiplied by 100.A Two-Stage Bimatrix Fishery Game Model 279
Initial stock size. To investigate the effect of the initial stock size on the
relative profitability of the agents, the model is re-run with 50% and 150% of the
base stock size of 1.8 million tonnes. The results we obtained indicate that in the
sole ownership solutions, T improves it's relative profitability as the stock size
increases; from 86.85% when the stock size is only 50% of the base case to 92.1%
when the stock size is 150% of the base case. The effect of stock size on the
relative profitability of the agents in the game solution is however not that clear:
T increases it's relative profitability both when the stock size is only 50% of the
original (90.6% as against 84.4% in the base case) and when the stock size is 150%
of the base stock size. In this case Ts relative profitability is 92.3%. As these
numbers show T's relative profitability increases by a larger margin when the
stock size increases than when it decreases.
Terminal constraint on the stock size to he left behind at the end of the game.
A requirement that not less than 50% of the initial stock size should be left in the
sea at the end of the game changes the outcome of the game significantly in the
game situation. In the sole ownership situation, however, the same solutions as in
the base case are obtained, mainly because this constraint is not binding in these
cases. Under such a requirement it turns out that T comes out better (in contrast
to the base case where it is C that does better), earning NOK 15.97 billion as
against C's NOK 12.98 billion. An important point to note here is that the intro-
duction of the terminal constraint, in the game environment, leads to an increase
in the overall benefit from the fishery from NOK 25.87 to NOK 28.95 billion. This
explains why economists advocate regulation when common property resources
are exploited in noncooperative environments.
Concluding remarks
The main findings of this study can be stated as follows: The optimal capacity
investments in terms of number of vessels for T and C in a competitive, nonco-
operative environment are 57 trawlers and 1050 coastal vessels, respectively. The
use of these capacities results in discounted benefits of NOK 11.84 and 14.03
billion, respectively, to T and C. and an overall discounted economic benefit of
NOK 25.85 billion to society at large. Using only T and C vessels in the exploi-
tation of the resource, the optimal fleet sizes are 70 and 1100. respectively. In
these cases the PV of economic rents are NOK 32.42 and 36.11 for T and C. We
also found out that, as expected, the results obtained are rather sensitive to
perturbations in fixed costs, interest rates, initial stock size and the terminal
constraint.
It is in order to state here that given that modeling and computation are always
exercises in successive approximation (Clark & Kirkwood, 1979), our estimates
should not be taken too literally. Having said this, the results of the analysis
indicate that in it's current state the Arcto-Norwegian cod fishery appears to
suffer from over capacity. Hence, the practical implication of this study with
respect to efficient management of the resource is that the excess capacity should
be run down as rapidly as possible to a certain level'^ somewhere above the Nash
'* The choice of this level will depend on both the depreciation rate and the difference
between the cost of acquiring a new vessel and the disinvestment resale price of the vessels
relative to the price of new vessels.280 U. R. Sumaila
equilibrium capacity level. Thereafter the remaining excess capacity is allowed to
depreciate to the "desired" level by itself. From then on new capacity investment
is undertaken only to make up for depreciation. This would ensure each player his
best possible outcome and the society the second best solution.
The practical implication of the results obtained would have been somewhat
different if the fishery were under-exploited. In this case, we distinguish between
starting a completely new fishery and the case where fishing is currently in prog-
ress. In the case of a new fishery, there is a real possibility for realising the first
best solution by allowing only C to exploit the resource with a capacity size of
about 1100 coastal fishery vessels. However, if political, social and cultural real-
ities dictate the participation of both players and this were to be in a noncooper-
ative environment, then each player should aspire to start off with its Nash equi-
librium capacity size as computed herein.
Appendix
The algorithm. The following non-standard Lagrangian function for player / fol-
lows from our model:
Li(n,e,y,k) =





where y : = y^ , is the player-invariant, but age and season-variant multiplers, and
alt other variables are as defined earlier.
The negative superscript on some components of the equation above is a
device introduced to ensure monotone convergence of multipliers by focusing
attention on the situations where there are constraint violations. Such a device
results in multipliers that are different from those associated with the classical
Lagrangians. There is a relationship between the two kinds of multipliers, how-
ever, the exact relationships are not so easy to retrieve. It is therefore necessary,
at this juncture, lo call for caution when interpreting the computed equilibrium
multiplier levels.
The gradient information obtainable from Lj(n,e,y), gives the adjustment equa-
tions for the effort levels and multipliers. We first introduce a special (switch)
function related to the derivative of «I>". before we state the adjustment equations.
Let the function H{r) = I if r < 0, and H{T) = 0 otherwise. If r ^ 0 were a
constraint inequality, then H{r) will attain a value of 1 if the constraint is violated,
otherwise it attains a value of 0. In writing the adjustment equations below, this
switch function is used.
Starting at arbitrary initial guesses of y^ s. n^.s. and c^^, we pursue the dynam-
ics given by the adjustment equations below, ali the way to the equilibrium solu-
tions.A Two-Stage Bimatrix Fishery Game Model 281
Effort adjustment. The adjustment equation for effort given by aLi(.)/aei,s is
ei.s = Si*( 2 ViWaqi.akina.s - ki^ie
A-l
ya.sH(^a-ina-l.s-! ^ na.s " ha.sK - qj.akjng.s
a=I
Multiplier adjustment. The equations for the sequential adjustment of the multi-
pliers are obtained by taking the negative of the partial differential of Li with
respect to the appropriate multiplier, that is, they come from aL/dyj,^.
For age group zero fish, the multiplier is adjusted according to the equation
yo,, = -H(f(B,_,) - noJ(f(B,_,) - n^J
Multipliers for fish of age groups between I and A-l are adjusted as follows
For the last age group, multiplier adjustment is according to
Here, the RHS of the equations are calculated and then the corresponding mul-
tipliers adjusted according to the magnitude and direction of the calculated result.
Nature's adjustment of the stock level. Natures objective can be expressed as
A-l
L-N — yo,s(f(Bs-l) ~ no.s) + ^ ya,s(?a-ina-|,s-1 ~ "a.s ~ hg.s)
a=l
This equation is derived from the fact that once the stock dynamics is obeyed,
nature's net benefit is 0, hence, L^ consist of only the constraint equations.
The updating rules forage groups, a = 0, a=l,...,A-2,a = A- 1, and
a = A are different and are given below separately. These are obtained by par-
tially differentiating L^,.) with respect to the corresponding stock level. That is,
they come from dh^{.)l^n.j^_^.
(1) The stock level of age zero fish is adjusted sequentially in accordance with
the equation.282 U. R. Sumaila
(2) Fish of age groups between I and A-2 are updated as follows.
(3) The last but one age group of fish (i.e., the A-1 age group) is adjusted in
accordance to the equation.
(4) Finally, the last age group, is updated using the following equation.
+ ^A-IHA-I.S - "A.s+l " hA.
-i + ^A-inA-i.s-i - nA.s - hA,s)| -1 - 2 Qi.
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